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  On November 1 the commander in chief recommended a division command to Congress. Although he felt himself “in a delicate situation” with respect to Lafayette, considering “his illustrious and important connections—the attachment which he has manifested to our cause, and the consequences, which his return in disgust might produce, that it will be adviseable to gratify him in his wishes.” This was especially important because “several gentlemen from France, who came over under some assurances, have gone back disappointed in their expectations.” Lafayette had urged them not to complain when they got home, “and in all his letters has placed our affairs in the best situation he could.” Besides, the young general was “sensible—discreet in his manners—has made great proficiency in our language, and from the disposition he discovered at the Battle of Brandy Wine, possesses a large share of bravery and military ardor.”19

  Lafayette did influence other French officers and had earned the undying loyalty of de Kalb. In a formal report to the war ministry, the baron explained: “The friendship with which he has honored me since I made his acquaintance, and that which I have vowed to him because of his personal qualities, oblige me to have that deference for him. No one is more deserving than he of the consideration he enjoys here. He is a prodigy for his age; he is the model of valor, intelligence, judgment, good conduct, generosity, and zeal for the cause of liberty for this continent.” Regarding Lafayette’s spendthrift ways, de Kalb said he had involved himself in them “only to advise economy.” Even though the marquis was rich, de Kalb had advised him to “exercise more control over his generosity and liberality. I have not failed to speak of this to him often.”20

  Lafayette was defensive about his spending. He had heard about the alarm his bills raised at home. On November 6 he wrote Adrienne, for the first time addressing his wife with the intimate tu (you) instead of the formal vous. His financial problems he blamed on the loss of Victoire and her cargo. Although everything was expensive in America, it was worth it. He enjoyed the love of all Americans and especially “a tender union, sustained by a reciprocal confidence, with the most respectable and admirable of men, General Washington.”21

  The young general presumed on his connections with Laurens’ father to promote the army’s well-being. “Thoug I am near a very hot fire,” he said, “howeer as my eyes fall in this moment upon three poor quite nacked fellows, it congeels in my blood and obliges me to tell you again how happy I would be if our army was drest in a comfortable manner.” He had heard rumors that France might go to war against England. “How many reasons I have to wish it of all my heart,” he crowed, “it would be too long to explain.”

  Two days later he announced that he was marching out with a detachment under Greene’s command. “I hope my wound w’ont be much hurted,” he said. “I shall never reproach myself loosing any occasion of doing some thing, as far as it can be for my present situation, or to speak better the inaction I am in.” He was excited, as his language reflected.22

  One foot booted, the other wrapped in a blanket, Lafayette again rode off to do righteous battle.

  THE MARQUIS IS DETERMINED TO BE IN THE WAY OF DANGER

  Cornwallis had expanded his reach over southern New Jersey, and the American Fabius saw a chance to raid an outpost, kill a few of the enemy, steal some livestock, and spread alarm. He and Greene cooked up a plan, and when Lafayette heard about it he volunteered to go along. Greene was happy to have him. They rode out on November 20, 1777, headed for a militia camp at Haddonfield.

  Greene gave the marquis command of about 350 men, militia and a detachment of Morgan’s rifles, and ordered him to reconnoiter toward Gloucester, where Cornwallis was encamped. On the twenty-fifth, Lafayette, still limping, crept toward an outpost. He could have been shot or captured, except, as he put it, “those who had the chance to kill him…counted too much on the dragoons, who should have taken him prisoner.” There were about 350 Hessians and two cannons at the outpost. He deployed flankers to harry them, and led his screaming men straight at the enemy center, which fell back in disorder and kept falling back even when redcoat reinforcements showed up. Afterward, Cornwallis moved his troops across the river. Lafayette’s action cost the enemy about sixty officers and men killed, wounded, or captured. He lost one officer killed and five enlisted men wounded. He retired to Haddonfield and reported to Greene.23

  It had been a splendid little engagement, and he knew it. So did Greene, who reported to Washington hoping that his remarks would support Lafayette’s case in Congress. After recounting the facts of the action, Greene concluded with the observation that Lafayette and his men “drove the enemy about half a mile and kept the ground until dark,” a clear sign of victory. He ended with a flourish: “The marquis is determined to be in the way of danger.”24

  It was the first battlefield command of Lafayette’s career, and he could not settle down. He hopped around on his good foot, as happy as he was excited. He could not wait to go to White Marsh to tell Washington. Greene suggested that he write a report, promising to send it along with his own.

  “I want to acquaint your excellency of a little event of last evening,” Lafayette began, “which tho’ not very considerable in itself will certainly please you on account of the bravery and alacrity a small part of ours showed in that occasion.” He had a gift for blowing his own horn by saluting others. The conduct of the soldiers was “above all praises.” He had never seen men “so merry, so spirited, so desirous to go on to the ennemy what ever forces they could have as that little party was in this little fight…. I returned to them my very sincere thanks this morning. I wish that this little success of ours may please you—tho’ a very trifling one I find him [it] very interesting on account of the behaviour of our soldiers.”

  Lafayette knew that his actions would meet with Washington’s approval. If he had had any doubts, his English would not have been so readable, although Greene may have helped him. In any event, the message overflowed with infectious enthusiasm. It also furthered his reputation for modesty, by downplaying his own achievement. He said of Greene, “I should have been very glad if circumstances had permitted me to be useful to him upon a greater scale.” He signed off with “the most tender affection and highest respect.”25

  The young soldier had done so well that Washington did not wait for him to get back to camp to forward Greene’s report to Congress, renewing his request to award a division to Lafayette. There were vacancies in the army, and the marquis had earned it. “I am convinced,” the general said, “he possesses a large share of that military ardor which generally characterizes the nobility of his country. He went to Jersey with Genl. Greene, and I find that he has not been inactive there.”26

  Congress was impressed with Greene’s report, especially the observation that “[t]he marquis is determined to be in the way of danger,” and ordered it published in several newspapers. The Continental Army could use generals with that kind of spirit. President Laurens already favored a line command. Lafayette gave him a nudge, at Washington’s prompting. “His excellency has been pleased to let you know a very small engagement on the other side of Delaware,” he observed. The skirmish was “very trifling in itself,” and no merit could be assigned to himself, “the general officer who was by chance with them.” However, he had the greatest pleasure to see “with what bravery and alacrity a little reconnoitring party” had beat up the Hessians. “I was there nothing almost but a witeness, but I was a very pleased one in seeing the behaviour of our men.”27

  Congress resolved “[t]hat General Washington be informed, it is highly agreeable…that the marquis de La Fayette be appointed to the command of a division in the Continental Army.” On December 4, 1777, Washington announced that he had been appointed to “command of the division lately commanded by General Stephen.” It was Lafayette’s lucky day, because the division he took over was from Washington’s home state, and he also learned of the birth of his second daughter, Anastasie.28

  Lafayette was polite and
deferential to his superiors. He sent Laurens his personal thanks. “I am very sensible of the mark of confidence I received from Congress in being appointed to a division of the army,” he said, promising to deserve it by his own and the division’s conduct on all occasions. His “tenderest and warmest attachement for our respectable and great general” made him especially grateful to command Washington’s fellow Virginians.29

  Word of Brandywine reached France in October, followed by news of Lafayette’s wound, the defeat at Germantown, and the victory at Saratoga. The marquis became caught up in French joy over England’s defeat. Newspapers had him single-handedly routing a British regiment at Brandywine, Voltaire praised him, street minstrels sang ballads about his bravery, even English mothers read stories about him to their children—and his father-in-law forgave him. “The very persons who had blamed him most for his bold enterprise now applauded him,” Lafayette’s friend Ségur recalled. “The court showed itself almost proud of him and all the young men envied him. Thus, public opinion, turning more and more toward the war, made it inevitable and dragged a government too weak to resist in the same direction.” The fugitive from the king’s warrant now carried the glory of France on his slight shoulders.30

  The British prime minister, Lord North, worried that the marquis’ celebrity would push France into the war. In December he sent an envoy to Paris to negotiate with Franklin, Deane, and a new American agent, Arthur Lee, but they spurned him. They told Congress that King Louis was determined to acknowledge American independence and “make a treaty with us of amity and commerce.” Besides the king’s “real good will to us and our cause,” it was in France’s interest that English power be diminished by the loss of its American colonies. “There is every appearance of approaching war.” There was more good news, a pledge of an additional grant to the United States of 3 million livres. Spain promised an equal sum.31

  As Americans used Lafayette to boost their interests in France, so did Vergennes. He had to overcome Maurepas’ resistance; the prime minister was shy about war, and he thought the marquis’ proposal to hire pirates was silly. The foreign minister, however, passed around Lafayette’s accounts of the military situation and claims of close connection to Washington. With the collapse of de Broglie’s plot, the boy general was the highest French officer with any potential to become generalissimo. It was a fading dream, but it lingered. The marquis created public sentiment that boosted Vergennes’ hopes of revanche for his country’s defeat in 1763.

  Lafayette reinforced it all with a long letter to d’Ayen in December 1777. It was time to claim his father-in-law’s respect. His rise to a divisional command provided the pretext, along with an introduction for John Adams, on his way to Paris to replace Deane. He offered a glowing account of the military situation and of his participation in events. He also dropped names and promoted France’s formal entry into the war. “America is most impatiently expecting us to declare for her,” he said. France, he hoped, would “decide to humble the pride of England.” The Americans were not, he confessed, as strong as he had expected, but with the help of France they would “win the cause” he so cherished “because it is just, because it honors humanity, because it is in the interest of my nation, and because my American friends and I are deeply committed to it.” The American cause was to squash the divine right of kings, although he had not yet recognized that. His words must have given his father-in-law, a pillar of royalist society, a chill.

  The marquis admitted that he had intended to lead a division from the outset, but went the whole summer without a command. He had spent that time “in General Washington’s household [là chés le Gal. Vashington], just as though I were in the home of a friend of twenty years.” After his victory in New Jersey, Lafayette claimed, Washington had offered him his choice of troops to command, and he had taken a division composed entirely of the general’s fellow Virginians. He predicted that America would win its war because of “the superiority of General Washington…Our general is a man formed, in truth, for this revolution, which could not have been accomplished without him.” The marquis saw the general “more intimately than any other man” and could testify that he was “worthy of the adoration of his country.” His warm friendship for Lafayette and his “complete confidence” in him in “all things military and political, large and small,” let the marquis “share everything he has to do, all the problems he has to solve and all the obstacles he has to overcome. Every day, I learn to admire more his magnificent character and soul.”32

  Lafayette had no intention of returning to the Hôtel de Noailles, however. “Don’t you think, my dear heart,” he asked Adrienne, “that after my return we shall be mature enough to establish ourselves in our own house, where we shall be happy together, receive our friends, establish an easy freedom, and read the foreign newspapers without having the curiosity of going to see for ourselves what is happening?”33

  Claiming to be an American hero, Lafayette wanted to be a French one as well, and enlisted Adrienne’s help. Sending his joy at the birth of their second daughter, he asked her to aid his cause and show American envoys around. He gave Adams a letter of introduction to her because “I thought it would not be disagreeable to you if I would desire Madame dela Fayette…to introduce you to some of my other friends.” He thrust his shy, lonely bride onto the stage of world affairs at the age of eighteen.34

  HE LIKES TO CONSULT ME ABOUT THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS

  Robert Morris became Lafayette’s private banker and financial manager. Morris put him on an allowance, which he usually exceeded, and forced him to ask for “loans” against his own account for anything extra. The system worked, more or less, but once Lafayette had his own troops he could not resist dipping into his purse to buy them food and clothing. He spent “very generously,” one of his aides said, buying everything he could find to equip and arm his soldiers. “This war has cost him enormous sums of money.”35

  “Your condescension Sir to take notice of the naked condition of our soldiery,” Henry Laurens told Lafayette, “is a mark of paternal regard for those your adopted sons.” He said he was “morally certain” of sending him a large supply of blankets and clothes before Christmas. They did not arrive.36

  The supply system of the Continental Army had collapsed by late fall 1777. The quartermaster general, Thomas Mifflin, fell out with Washington over the loss of Philadelphia, but he had been notably unhelpful anyway. The quartermaster’s department was in “a most wretched condition,” Greene complained, because Mifflin had not been seen with the army since it entered Pennsylvania. In November, Washington forced him to resign. Mifflin then had a grievance against the commander in chief, and he nursed it. The burden of army supply fell increasingly on Greene, whom Washington persuaded to become quartermaster general late in the winter.37

  There was a separate commissary general of subsistence, to provide the army’s food, but transportation was the responsibility of the quartermaster, and Mifflin had neglected it. The army’s suffering that winter was due to a shortage of wagons and draft animals, without which nothing could be hauled even if it had been procured. The Continental Army suffered from bad currencies, which shippers and suppliers would not accept, and competition from the British in Philadelphia, who paid in hard cash.38

  Thomas Mifflin, by C.W. Peale, 1783–84. The failed quartermaster general nursed a grudge against Washington that played a large role in the “Conway Cabal.” (INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK)

  A delegation from Congress visited Washington early in December 1777, urging him to attack Philadelphia and drive the British out. He asked his council of war for advice, and Lafayette echoed the other generals. Attacking fortified positions would invite unacceptable casualties, he said. The terrain posed obstacles, such a movement could not be kept secret, the militia was nowhere to be seen, and supplies were short. He advised going into winter quarters.39

  John Laurens was outraged that Congress would suggest such a thing. “Our army in pa
rticular requires exemption from fatigue in order to compensate for their want of clothing,” he railed at his father; “relaxation from the duties of a campaign, in order to allow them an opportunity of being disciplined and instructed; warm quarters, that it may appear in the spring with undiminished numbers and in the full powers of health; etc. Besides it is urged that the hardships which our soldiers undergo discourage men from enlisting.”40

  Nobody wanted to join an army that looked, as one private described it, “not only starved but naked.” The greater part of the men were not only shirtless and barefoot but “destitute of all other clothing, especially blankets.” The Continental Army was “as disheartened as need be.” When the troops reached their winter quarters a few days before Christmas, “[i]n our miserable condition, to go into the wild woods and build us habitations to stay (not to live) in, in such a weak, starved and naked condition, was apaling in the highest degree.”41

  On December 19, 1777, the army went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, twenty miles northwest of Philadelphia. It actually was a steep ridge overlooking the Schuylkill River, a windswept, inhospitable place. Its only natural comforts were an abundant water supply and nearby forests to provide firewood and building materials. Washington selected it because it was defensible and because it stood between the British army and York, where the disgruntled Congress sat. De Kalb suggested that the place had been chosen on the advice of a speculator, a traitor, or a council of ignoramuses. Nobody argued with him.42