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  Making separate arrangements for supplying two national armies presented complications that nobody had foreseen, and the loans from France were not large enough. Lafayette buried La Luzerne in complaints that demands exceeded resources. Corny had not brought along enough cash, and Lafayette had told the French government that he could not be involved in financial affairs. Asking the ambassador to help Corny buy livestock, he said, “As for me…I am only an American officer here.” He was Washington’s man, not the French government’s.17

  Thinking over their strategic talks at Morristown, Washington concluded that New York definitely should be the first target for the allied forces. He asked Lafayette to advise Rochambeau and Ternay to go to Sandy Hook, because the enemy’s force included only about 8,000 regulars and about 4,000 refugees and militia. The Royal Navy had only one ship of the line and three or four small frigates in the harbor. Ternay’s fleet could beat that, he believed. He told the marquis to “place these things in the fullest light to the French commanders by way of recommendation, leaving it to them to act according to the condition of the fleet and troops.” Washington also asked him to write to the French naval commander in the West Indies, urging him to sail north. The need to encode and decode multiple copies of all messages was as new to the marquis as it was to the Americans.18

  Lafayette wrapped up his business in Philadelphia on May 20 and that day advised Vergennes that he had carried out his instructions. Believing that Congress was “too numerous to act with discretion and dispatch,” Washington had asked that a committee be formed to mobilize the nation’s resources. Lafayette and La Luzerne had talked the lawmakers into implementing the proposal. As a result, he predicted, the Continental Army would have more stability and the French troops would not lack necessary provisions. The American army, he admitted, was very small, badly dressed, and poorly armed, all these problems being caused by the depreciation of the paper money, but he expected things to improve. If the French troops arrived in time, it was “a safe bet that New York is ours.”

  As for the man in charge, “Without being biased, sir, by the tender friendship I share with General Washington, I can assure you that the generals and French troops will have nothing but praise for his honesty, his delicacy, and that noble and frank politeness that characterizes him, at the same time that they will have to admire his great talents.” Lafayette had told him that the French generals were as much under his orders as the Americans, but he did not intend to exercise his command in a “severe or arbitrary manner.” The decision to send help to America was the right one: “my American friends hold, and Paris may rest assured that they will not abandon us.”19

  Lafayette received an express from Washington the same day. “Finish your business as soon as you can and hasten home,” his adoptive father told him, “for so I would always have you consider head quarters and my house.”20

  WHAT M. DE LAFAYETTE HAS WRITTEN YOU IS PURELY A RESULT OF HIS ZEAL

  From Rhode Island to Virginia, officers and signalmen skipped stones across the water, waiting for Rochambeau and Ternay. The British and Hessians in New York also wondered when the French would arrive. The Hessian general Knyphausen marched out of New York early in June and camped near Elizabethtown. Washington moved in the enemy’s direction, but declined to fight, preferring to wait for his allies. Word arrived that Clinton had taken Charleston, and then Clinton himself reached New York with troops and ships. Knyphausen returned to the city, and Washington marched to Paterson, New Jersey. There he watched the enemy and wondered where the promised help from France was.

  Lafayette wrote letters describing the American uniforms so that French officers could tell one rank from another. He sent out periodic updates on the military situation for Rochambeau to receive when he arrived. And he revived his dream of invading Canada, at least for La Luzerne’s ears. The ambassador asked him to drop it, because there were more important things to do in the thirteen states. Lafayette had to admit that there was little support for his northward ambitions, but just in case, he told the ambassador, he was sending spies north, who, if they were captured, would “serve to put the enemy on the wrong scent.” He loved being a spymaster as much as being a commander.21

  It was as a commander that the young general received his greatest treat in July. Washington ordered all troops to wear red, white, and blue cockades, the colors representing the United States, France, and Spain. Lafayette had been discussing with him plans for a new Light Division, which he would command. On July 4 he asked the general’s permission to deck his men out with black and red plumes, which he had imported for them to wear. Washington and Steuben had discussed a light infantry division for some time, and Lafayette had proven himself an able leader of such troops. On July 16, 1780, the commander in chief ordered each regiment to detail officers and enlisted men to the new division. “The men should be mostly of a middle size, active, robust, and trusty, and the first twenty must be all old soldiers.” By the end of the month Lafayette had his division, plumes and all.22

  The marquis and Washington talked about how to deploy the French forces. Writing to Rochambeau and Ternay at Cape Henry, where they were expected to put in first, Lafayette told them that the best way to attack New York would be to land French troops on Long Island, where they would be joined by the Americans. General Washington and he had “absolutely no doubt” that it could succeed. There were 7,000 Americans ready to march, “and, without boasting, I can vouch that they will be at least equal to the best troops that are opposed to them,” while the enemy did not exceed 10,000 men. He interspersed his own comments “as a private individual,” especially about the need for clothing and other supplies. “There you have, gentlemen, what General Washington instructed me to add to my previous letters. He thinks that these proposals will be presented to you in clearer fashion in French.”23

  The French commanders arrived off Newport—not Cape Henry—on July 10, with a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves on their heels. They entered the harbor and began landing men the next day, and Graves blockaded the harbor entrance. The force was smaller than promised, and two months late because of bureaucratic incompetence during loading in France. The most important supplies for the Americans were not with them. Rochambeau forwarded a note from Vergennes, who told Lafayette that the convoy carried “5,500 effectives; the shortage of transport ships did not permit us to send more men, and the season is too far advanced to send the rest immediately.” What gave him “the greatest pain” was that clothing, arms, and ammunition for the American army were not aboard Ternay’s ships. He did not know whom to blame for that.

  Rochambeau told the people of Newport that his force was just the “first division” and that a “second division” was expected soon. That cheered the natives, who rang all the church bells in town, while the French occupied the old British works. Rochambeau had so many men sick that he did not think he could march for at least two months.24

  With only rumors in the air that the allies had arrived, Lafayette and Hamilton refined the plan to take New York, in the form of another letter to the French commanders. Washington had heard that Graves was in American waters, and that gave him pause. He asked the marquis to revise his letter, and Lafayette overreacted, thinking that the commander wanted to abandon the plan altogether, while he wanted to storm the city. “Such are, my dear general, the ideas which I gave out in our last conversation.”25

  Washington patiently explained his reasoning. The marquis had “totally misconceived” his meaning if he thought he would “relinquish the idea of enterprizeing against New York till it appears obviously impracticable from the want of force, or means to operate,” he said. What he had in mind by discouraging the first draft of the letter to the French commanders was, “1st…I thought we ought not to give them more than information of Greave’s [sic] arrival, & 2dly. not to hold up strong ideas of success…because I never wish to promise more than I have a moral certainty of performing.”26

  Washington g
uided Lafayette’s revised letter, which included a warning to the French that Graves had been sighted off New York. The draft had said that “we believe” that this should not change plans for an attack on the city. The message as sent said, “You can judge better than we what we can expect from your naval situation, and you will decide how far it will be prudent to follow the plan proposed by General Washington.” Ternay declared that he could not cross the bar at Sandy Hook and preferred to fight the enemy at sea.27

  The French commanders wanted to meet Washington. Because he could not leave camp, he sent Lafayette as his liaison. Washington armed him with a private document, for his eyes only, to provide a basis for discussions. There were eight points, the first of which was the need for naval superiority. Second, the advantages of taking New York Harbor were “so obvious, as not to need recapitulation.” Number seven showed some distrust of the allies. “It must be clearly understood and agreed between the parties,” Washington explained, “that if any capital operation is undertaken, the French fleet and land forces will at all events continue their aid until the success of the enterprize, or until it is mutually determined to abandon it.”

  The American commander softened that with the last item. “In all matters…the marquis (in behalf of the United States) will consult the convenience and wishes of the count and chevalier” and assure them that Washington intended “to make every thing as agreeable to them as possible” owing to “the high sense I entertain of their merits and of the generous aid they have brought us.” He sent Lafayette off to negotiate, with letters of commendation. “As a general officer,” Washington told his new allies, “I have the greatest confidence in him; as a friend he is perfectly acquainted with my sentiments and opinions; he knows all the circumstances of our army and the country at large; all the information he gives and all the propositions he makes, I entreat you will consider as coming from me.”28

  Washington had boundless confidence in Lafayette, but he was sending a boy to do a man’s job. He did not realize that the marquis was not as popular in the French army as in America. He had also acquired a bad attitude toward Rochambeau’s enterprise, especially when he learned that the clothing and other materials he had bought were not in Ternay’s convoy. He had reached a private conclusion that the French general intended to sit in Newport and let the war go on without him. He may have been right about that, because on July 16, 1780, Rochambeau advised the minister of war to send him more troops, ships, and money, “but do not count on these people or on their resources; everyone here is without money and without credit.” He thought the French army would have to fight the British on its own, and he would not do that without reinforcements.29

  Lafayette left for Rhode Island on July 19 and reassured his adoptive father, “But I dare say they will be satisfied with my coming.” He recruited militia and supplies as he rode through New England, and was happy to learn that Americans and Frenchmen were getting along well at Newport. The closer he got to his destination, however, the more he grumbled about the shortage of gunpowder in the French convoy. Still, he told Washington, he had “great hopes of succès,” especially after a French ship docked in Boston with a cargo of powder.30

  Washington answered as often as he could. On the twenty-second he bowed to Ternay’s judgment that his ships could not cross the bar at New York, asked the marquis, “however painful it is to abuse the generosity of our friends,” to press them for arms and powder, and told him to beg off again on a personal meeting with the French commanders. When Lafayette reached Newport, he found Rochambeau paralyzed by reports that Clinton and Graves planned to attack him, and he relayed Rochambeau’s request for a diversion. In response, Washington moved troops to Kings Ferry, and Clinton hunkered down in New York.31

  Rochambeau and Ternay were determined to sit still until their second division showed up. “Don’t fear by any means theyr acting rashly,” Lafayette sneeringly told Washington, “and be assur’d that you may very far depend on theyr caution.” He said he had told Rochambeau that he thought fears of an attack from Clinton were baseless and “that if the second division comes we must attack. That in all cases if we are masters of the water we may attack.” He claimed that the French soldiers and sailors all wanted to join up with Washington’s army, but their leaders were dragging their feet. Fearing that he would miss an attack on New York, Lafayette pleaded for permission to rejoin the Main Army. He left on August 3 without waiting for the local commander’s approval and before receiving that of the commander in chief.32

  Washington suspected that Lafayette was not behaving diplomatically. The marquis should not press the French general and admiral to undertake “anything to which they show a disinclination,” he advised. “Should they yield to importunity and an accident happen either there or here they would lay the consequences to us…. Our prospects are not so flattering as to justify our being very pressing to engage them in our views.”

  As for Lafayette wanting to rejoin the Main Army, Washington would have attacked New York if Clinton had gone to Rhode Island, but he had not thought an action was likely, and in fact the redcoats had pulled back into the city once he demonstrated. The marquis was more useful at Newport, and besides, he could not have reached New York in time for a sudden battle.33

  A letter from Vergennes was on its way to Lafayette, offering excuses for why the second division and its supplies would not be on their way soon. He had come to that conclusion on his own, and when he reached Washington’s camp on August 7, 1780, he began a memorandum to Rochambeau and Ternay, which he sent on the ninth. Since he was asking for feedback before he prepared a final report to the commander in chief, he did not show it to Washington. If he had, the elder man would have edited it. Consequently, he learned too late that his young friend lacked diplomatic talent and the deference a junior officer should show to a senior.34

  Lafayette summarized, point by point, what he had told the French commanders, emphasizing early action against New York. His most galling statement was, “In proposing that you send your stores to Providence, I told you that Rhode Island was useless to the Americans but that it was valuable for the aid coming from France, provided, however, that it did not need an army to guard it.” If the English made the mistake of seizing Rhode Island, “a superior fleet with help from the mainland would always be able to take it back.” This was a direct challenge to Rochambeau and Ternay’s judgment, even their competence. Not only was he insulting, but he was wrong. A sizable French force on that island was a strategic sword pointed at Clinton’s side.

  The marquis next summarized, point by point, how they had answered him. He could be nasty. “The assistance sent to the United States was anything but provisional,” he claimed they had said; “the second division should have left shortly after you, and we might expect it at any moment.” He quarreled with Ternay on whether his fleet could control the channels around New York or cross the bar at the harbor mouth. His tone was abrasive, and he strayed into the political effects of French inaction, an area beyond his official competence. He made his points sound like orders from him to the French commanders. “It is very clearly settled that as soon as the French attain naval superiority, they must not lose a single day in beginning the joint effort.” Urging an early reply correcting any misstatements, he said that “since America’s fate appears to depend on your activity or inactivity during the rest of this summer, I place the greatest importance on representing your ideas perfectly…. I shall wait here eagerly, gentlemen, for your reply to this letter.”

  Lafayette was not done yet. He assured the general and commodore that it was “important to act during this campaign [year]. All of the troops that you may expect from France next year, as well as all of the plans for which you may hope, will not make up for the fatal harm of our inaction. Without American resources, no amount of foreign aid can accomplish anything in this country.” He declared that it was very important to “take advantage of the times when you find an opportunity for cooperation
here. Without it you can do nothing in America for the common cause.”35

  Lafayette sent a copy of this diatribe to La Luzerne. He had “tried to destroy these gentlemen’s false ideas on some points,” he said, “for I admit I do not share their opinion on many things.” He was especially critical of the decision to sit tight at Newport. “I am considered too American not to be suspected of partiality,” he admitted. He claimed to have superior knowledge of American public opinion, which he feared could be turned into a belief that there would be no second division. Tories were already claiming that, and asserting that France’s policy was to prolong the war.

  Lafayette charged that Rochambeau was “too attached to this post on Rhode Island.” Another thing that “humiliated” him was that “M. de Ternay refused under any circumstances to force the harbor of New York, and I slightly changed the construction of the account I gave on that subject.” Although Lafayette was “not happy with M. de Ternay,” he respected Rochambeau, except that the general always yielded to Ternay. He asked La Luzerne to give the general “some good advice…of the necessity of acting as soon as possible.”36

  Rochambeau had written to Washington on August 10, before he received Lafayette’s memorandum. He declared, “I do not think we can make any attempt on New York and Long Island without naval superiority” through the second division from France, or the French fleet from the West Indies, or if Clinton sent part of his troops and ships out of New York. That was the end of that.37

  The French general received Lafayette’s screed two days later. Rochambeau was famous for not getting angry about anything, but the impertinent marquis worked him into a raging lather. He sent a cold reply, brushing the young man off. He referred to his letter to Washington and declared, “I restrict myself, therefore, to awaiting his latest orders and to asking him the favor of a meeting, so that the commodore and I may go and verbally receive from him in conversation a definitive plan.” He disagreed that French possession of Rhode Island was “of no use to the Americans.” It might have been what caused Clinton to withdraw into New York, and it forced the enemy fleet to watch it, so “your American coasts are peaceful, your privateers take very advantageous prizes, and your maritime commerce goes on in complete freedom.”38